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only; the burden of' proving a better- title than the, defendant in
order' to" win. 18 However, the trend of later cases- has been. to
impose on. the- plaintiff as great. a burden of proof as- he -would
bear in a. petitory, action, that is, the burden of proving a-valid
title in himself.14 The .confusion of the action to. establish title
with the petitory action, has' beclouded: the evident', purpose. of
Act'. 38 of 1908 - to relieve the.claimant, of having, to bear' as
great, a) burden of proof when his, adversary isnot in possession
aszwhen the. adversary is in possession of the property in questioni. Otherwisej if, the-burden of proof were to remain the same
asthat required. of' the~plaintiff in' a-petitory action, it is' difficult
to see. what. practical: purpose:. the' act has!. served. Should. the
court: have- occasion to: re-examine its position regarding. this
matter,. it'is suggested. that,the act be. considered. ini the light of
its original purpose.
Patsy Jb M6Dowell:
TORTS -NJRY'

WHILE SPORT FISHING -.

RES IPSA LOQUITUR,

Plaintiff-was-injured by a lure: cast, by' defendant while both
parties, were- fishing from' a. boat. In a- suit. against; defendant:
and his: liability insurer the:plaintiff! alleged negligence: in speci.,
fied. respects. Defendant denied negligence- and, pleaded, in the'
alternative7 that,.plaintiff had assumed the risks: incident-to the
sport. The testimony of both parties was equally unilluminating.
Plaintiff testified that he did not know what had happened, had
seen, nothing, and defendant testified that he knew only that he.
had. made. an. overhand- cast-and, feeling an. obstruction, turned.
tosee.the hooks lodged' in.plaintiff's cheek. In denying recovery
for negligence, the trial court. held- that plaintiff had failed to
prove his case with the required certainty.' On appeal, plaintiff
conceded, this failure but urged that recovery was nevertheless
in order under the doctrine of' res ipsa loquitur. The court of.
13: See the expressions of the court in support of this view: Metcalfe v. Green,
140 La; 950, 74 So. 261 (1916) ; Baltimore v. Lutcher, 135 La. 873i 66 So. 253
('1914)';
Quaker Realty Co. Praying for Confirmation of Title, 10 Orl. App: 79
(La. App.' 1914) . See also Doiron v. Vacuum Oil Co., 164 La. 15, 113 So. 748
(1927) ; Ellis v. Louisiana Planting Co., 146 La. 652, 83 So. 885 (1920).
14. See Albritton v. Childers, 225. La. 900, 74 So.2d 156, (1954) ; Stockstill' v;
Choctaw Towing'Corp., 224 La. 473, 70 So.2d 93 (1953) ; Dugas v. Powell, 197
La. 409, 1 So.2d 677 (1941).
1. Plaintiff' recovered $154,65, covering medical and. hospital expenses due
under policy provisions establishing compensation for injury- to another, resulting
from insured's activities.
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appeal, 'held,:amended ;and ;affirmed. 2 The -doctrine .of res ipsa
lloquitur; is iapplicable; and, 'inasmuch las the :defendant :failed -to
discharge'the, duty of showing:his freedom from:negligence, the
plaintiff must recover. Thedoctrine of assumption -of risk fdoes
not-require that one taking parttin :a-fishing venture.assumethe
risk of .injury resulting solely from, another's negl.igence. *Hawayek v. Simmons, 91 So.2d 49 (La. App. 4956).
-In most -cases in -Which ,recovery -ispredicated ,on;another's
-negligence, -pro6f- of-such negligence iis'based largely -on -circum-Stantial evidence. 'The trier willusually determine the:issue of
negligence by weighing'the probabilities which sarise from ithe
-facts:presented.3 However,'in;many:cases tthe plaintiff does .not
!have-adequate -information about how; the incident -occurred, -and

ithe, defendant cannot-or willnot -disclose .the 'circumstances. In
,this situation the trier is -not;presented ,with the particular .acts
of defendant upon which to ibase 'a determination :of the rprobabilities of negligence. In that area in 'which; a rational :mindcan
,determine from. common experience and 'aconsideration ,of the

-fact of the occurrence alone that .the. ini ury.;sustained As tmore
.likelythan not a.result of defendant's negh'gence,the :doctrineof
.res ipsa loquitur is often. applied. 4 The. doctrine,. however, -is .not
a solvent to be automatically applied. 5 It does not establish or
'2. -Affirmed as to medical -and hospital expenses. and amended. to, include an
award of $1500 under-the negligence liability provisions of the policy.
3. i2 HARPER -& 'J aiS, TE'LAw OF"TORTS"§' 19.3 "(1956) ; "Paossaa, 'H-slD'BOOK OF THE LAW ".OF TORTS §'42 (2d 'ed. 1955) ; Malone, .Re$Ipsa -Loquitur-attd
"Proof by 'Inference - A 'Discussion of ' the- Louisiana 'Cases, 4 L OTJSIANA LAw
REv Ew 70 ,i(1941). As,to .prodf .ofa fact by circumstantial evidence,'see I IWIo4'MORE, .EVHENCE .§ 25 :(3d ed.'1940).
"s;'THE
LAw OF ToRTsl 1945 (1956) ;.1PROSSsR, .HA1DnOOX
-.
4. 2 'HARPER. & Jk
,OF THE.LAW OF TORTS §842, (2d ed.t1955) :"'In the:situation, to which.-res, ipsa:.lo,quitur as a distinctive.rule, applies, thereis no evidence,.circumstantialor-otherwise,
at least none of sufficient probative value,.to show. negligenceiapart from: the,,postulate -which. rests on -common experience and, not, on ..the, specific circumstances
of. the instant case -. that.physical. cause of .the .kind which produced. the.,accident
in question.do not ordinarily exist in the absence of negligence." .Annot,,.59.A.L.R.
468, 470 (1942). There.are three conditions which are often stated as essential
'for the application of "this doctrine: (1) the accident'.must have;.been of :such..a
-nature as would-not normally. occur without. someone's negligence; '(2) Ahe defend-ant must have'had control of the injuring instrumentality at the:time of the injury; and (3) 'the accident must not-have-'been, due -to-any.action"orcontribution
'of the'plaintiff. .It ishighlydoubtful'that, these-conditions must-be-met at all,-times
before the doctrine will be applied. See 2 HARPER & JAMES, THEILAw"or'TORTS
§§ 19.5, 198' '(1956) ;'.Malone, ResIpsa Loquitur and Proof"by Inference - A'Disoussion of the *LouisianaCases, ,4 'LOuiSIANA LAw REvrXw '70 (1941') ;"Proseer,
'The ProceduralEffect of :Res Ipsa Loquitur, 20 MINN.'L.' REv. '241' (1936).
5. 'If that 'phrase had-not been-in Latin,'nobody would have cailld..ita.prin'ciple"' 'Lord 'Shaw 'in, Ballard v. North *British:Ry., fSess. Cas,,(H.L. '43 '("1923).
Accoiding to'.Dean'-;Prosser 'the 'phrase is" an.6ffspring6fUa' casual word,'ofBaron
"P6llaek, during 'argument 'with couns'el'-in Byrne''v. 'Boadle, 2 H. & 'Co."722, 159
Eng. Rep. 299 (Ex. 1863). Dean Prosser would 'prefer* that 'this !'tag," 4'iih
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delimit a distinct area of the law of negligence but is rather an
instrument of judicial expression which, to be understood, must
be viewed in the light of the circumstances surrounding its use.
A survey of the cases which seem to invite a consideration of this
doctrine indicates that the fact of admitting or denying its applicability reflects the courts' attitude toward the administration
of negligence liability in particular fact situations. One factor
which appears to influence a court's decision heavily as to the
application of res ipsa loquitur under given circumstances is the
value to society of the defendant's activity.' Where the injury is
caused by an activity which is of little benefit to or presents a
serious threat to society,6 a court is more apt to apply this doctrine. For example in a case involving firearms which present
a serious threat to society with little off-setting value, a court
will readily apply res ipsa loquitur, thereby requiring little by
way of positive proof of defendant's negligence. 7 . Conversely,
except in the most flagrant cases a court will reject the application of res ipsa loquitur in medical malpractice suits.8 As the
value of the activity to society increases, or the risks entailed
decrease, the likelihood of a finding of negligence lessens. The
standard of care in a particular situation - the threshold of
leads only to confusion, "be consigned to the legal dustbin."
cedural Effect of Res Ipa

Prosser, The Pro-

Loquitur, 20 MINN. L. REV. 241, 271 (1936) : "It

adds

nothing to the law, has no meaning which is not more clearly expressed for us in
English, and brings confusion to our legal discussions. It does not represent a
doctrine, is not a legal maxim, and is not a rule." Bond, C.J., dissenting in Po-

tomac Edison Co. v. Johnson, 160 Md. 33, 40, 152 Atl. 633, 636 (1930).
6. 2 HARPER & JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 1084, § 19.6 (1956); Jensen v.
Minard, 44 Cal.2d 325, 328, 282 P.2d 7, 8 (1955) : "To put the matter another
way, the amount of caution required by the law increases, as does the danger that
reasonably should be apprehended. . . . What ordinary care is in any particular
case depends upon what the circumstances are."

7. Jensen v. Minard, 44 Cal.2d 325, 327, 282 P.2d 7, 8 (1955) : "[O]wing to
the dangerous character of the instrumentality ordinary care in the use of firearms requires a very high degree of caution." Recovery allowed in all of the following: Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal.2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948) ; Adams v. Dunton,

284 Mass. 63, 187 N.E. 90 (1933) ; Winans v. Randolph, 169 Pa. 606, 32 Ati. 622
(1895) ; Harper v. Holcombe, 146 Wis. 183, 130 N.W. 1128 (1911) ; Underwood
v. Hewson, 1 Strange 596, 93 Eng. Rep. 722 (K.B. 1891). See Inbau, Firearms
and Legal Doctrine, 7 TuL. L. REV. 529, 551 (1933) for an extensive survey of
hunting accidents.
8. Farber v. Olkon, 40 Cal.2d 503, 254 P.2d 520 (1953) (no recovery for unfortunate choice of wrong method of treatment) ; Meador v. Arnold, 264 Ky. 378,

94 S.W.2d 626 (1936)

(mistaken diagnosis alone not sufficient for recovery).

Re-

covery was allowed in the following: Nelson v. Painless Parker, 104 Cal. App.

770, 286 Pac. 1078 (1930) (dropped tooth down windpipe) ; Evans v. Roberts, 172
Iowa 653, 154 N.W. 923 (1915) (cut off piece of patient's tongue during operation
on adenoids) ; Lewis v. Casenburg, 157 Tenn. 187, 7 S.W.2d 808 (1928) (extreme

X-ray burns resulting in death).

1958]

NOTES

negligence- may depend in great measure upon an evaluation
of this factor.9
In many cases, such as the instant case, another factor, seemingly opposed to the one discussed above, comes in for consideration. This further element arises when both parties are engaged
in an activity wherein there exists a mutuality or reciprocity of
risk. Where each party is exposing the other to the same hazards
and it is a mere matter of chance that the plaintiff is injured
rather than the defendant, the courts, moved by a sense of fair
play, are less disposed to consider as negligent conduct which
might otherwise be so viewed. 10 For example, where two golfers
are each exposing the other to the same risks the tendency is to
deny recovery for injury resulting from risks commensurate
with the sport." The courts will require a greater showing of
affirmative proof of the defendant's negligence, and are apparently not as prepared to infer such negligence from the fact of
the occurrence alone. This is to be contrasted to cases involving
a plaintiff-caddy and a defendant-golfer in which recovery is
generally allowed without such an affirmative showing. 12 This
would appear to indicate the courts' readiness to appreciate the
one-sidedness of the risk in resolving the issue of negligence, for
the caddy does not in turn expose the golfer to the risks to which
the golfer subjects him.
In the instant case the court was of the opinion that the
rights of a person injured in an accident in which the cause is
9. For an able discussion of the various factors involved and their effect in
the determination of negligence, see Terry, Negligence, 29 HARv. L. REV. 40

(1915).

10. In its treatment of this area the court may achieve the same result via
two different methods: it may refuse to apply the doctrine and require that the
plaintiff show the defendant's negligence by facts other than the mere fact of the
occurrence of the incident, or may allow application of the doctrine but hold that
the plaintiff assumed the risks of injury.
11. Houston v. Escott, 85 F. Supp. 59 (D. Del. 1949); Rogers v. AllisChalmers Mfg. Co., 153 Ohio St. 513, 92 N.E.2d 677 (1950) ; Benjamin v. Nernberg, 102 Pa. Super. 471, 157 AtI. 10 (1931). However, recovery has been allowed
for breaches of the generally recognized rules of the game, such as a party's failure to precede his drive with the-customary warning of "Fore": Getz v. Freed, 377
Pa. 480, 105 A.2d 102 (1954) ; Alexander v. Wrenn, 158 Va. 486, 164 S.E. 715

(1932).
12. Biskup v. Hoffman, 220 Mo. App. 542, 287 S.W. 865 (1926) ; Toohey v.
Webster, 97 N.J.L. 545, 117 AtI. 838 (1922) ; Povanda v. Powers, 272 N.Y. Supp.
619, 152 Misc. 75 (1934) ; Simpson v. Fiero, 260 N.Y. Supp. 323, 237 App. Div.
62 (1932) ; Gardner v. Heldman, 82 Ohio App. 1, 80 N.W.2d 681 (1948). Contra:
Stober v. Embry, 243 Ky. 117, 47 S.W.2d 921 (1932) (caddy watching but careless) ; Page v. Unterreiner, 106 S.W.2d 528 (Mo. App. 1937) (player careful,
caddy careless). For interesting articles on golfing cases see Clothier, Negligence
in Golf, 9 TEMP. L.Q. 42 (1934) ; Note, Negligence - Golf - Liability Players and
Course Operators, 11 N.Y.U.L.Q. REV. 452 (1934).
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utnknoWn to him'must:be!protected. The court,:assuming that the
defendant was aware of his own acts, placed upon him'the burden of proving himself -free from -negligence.18 The -court was
of the furtheropinion that in the absence of.-such proof the acci,dent could only-be -presumed to have been a'result of fault on the
part of the defendant and therefore recovery was in order. The
decision appears to be supported by the "benefit to -society" fac'tor discussed above, as sport fishing is not impressively benefi'cial to society. Evidence of a- consideration of the isecond'factor
discussed, mutuality of :risk, is not as apparent in the decision.
In'rejecting the defendant's plea'of assumption of rHsk, the cour-t
stated -that -whereas ,one participating in 'a sport -assumes all
--risks, commensurate with, that: activity one does not assume the
'risk-.of an injury resulting solely from defendant's 'want'of care.
-In the instant case this is mislea'dingIfor the -defendant's -ne~liigence was not' established by. affirmative 'pr'6f'but 'rath'er was
,merely-a presumption of law trdsulting from '.the- apllic.'i6n Iof
'the doctrine of "res ipsa lo~quitur. Inits.denial df -the'plea,6 assuniption of :risk-the 'court assfumed that'the defen'dant'was -negligent,: th'e 'very inquiry with which it was confroite6d. The'fact
that each -party was exposing the other to similr ,-hdzards is -a
matter which 'must be given serious consideration 'in dete mining what conduct will constitute negligence. 'It'is-interesting -to
consider the nature of the two cases upon which the- court-relied
in support Of its. decision to reject the plea of assumption of risk.
In -thelfirst -the -plaintiff -was--an ..employee, -a -caddy, -of -the-defendant-4golfer ;14 in the -other the plaintiff, a spectatorat.,a~polo
contest, was injured by a player who failed to maintain reasonable control of 'his'horse.' 5 In neither of these cases.did.-any, mutuality -of -risk -exist. The instant case :may be 'm're 8dl'sely
analogized to the player-player cases in -golf.in w1hich .recovery
-is: usually denied 'due, in part, to the -existence of--a -muit ility of
risk. The importance 6f'this element in-determining'iability..1or
-negligence -has ,been -forcefully :expressed by 'Prfessor 'Vold:
"[T] his "mltuality 'of' risk -is one of the great foundation :stones
on which the main structure of the law of negligence has been
erected, and ... withoditit the negligence, doctrine 'oses~its ,at-.

13. In Louisiana 'there is'no ;procedural .shifting--of the biiden'ofprodf. For
-an, excellent -discussion' of this problem 'and' a thorough, commentary ldn Lolaiafia
cases, see 'Malone,-"Res Ip'sa LoqtUtur',and 'Prdof by Inferene - A Dioebisaibn bf
'the-Louisiana Oases,'4-.LouINA:,LAw'Rtv.yw 70,"84 et seq. 1(1941).
-14. T6bbey'v.'Webster,.97 N.J.L.'545, 117.t1.' 838: (1922).
15. Douglas v. Converse, 248. Pa. 232, 93 :,!Atl.-.955 '(1915).
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traction as being inherently fair.' 6 "it is submitted that in the
instant case this element of reciprocity did exist, as both parties
were fishing, and it was a mere matter of chance.that the.plaintiff rather than -the defendant was injured. Therefore the -court
should have required for recovery an affirmative showing of a
high degree of deviation from the -norm of fishermen's conduct.
However, the -liability insurer of the defendant -was a co-defendant, and it is not unlikely that the theory of social absorption of
negligence liability achieved through the, widespread use of'such
-insurance is reflected in'the court's decision.
It is interesting to speculate on the outcome of'future similar
litigation. With the increasing amount of 'leisure'time availible
to the average man, hobbies and other modes of recreation'and
diversion will assume more social importance; such activities
•may even become' socially imperative. The benefits derived by
-society *fromsport activities,:therefore, may'receive'wider :appre"ciation-with a' resulting noticeable: effect upon the -application 'of
negligence -liability in this -area.
Henry A. "Politz
'1'6. 'Void, .Aircraft .Operdtors -Liabiity -for Ground Damage .'and -Passenger
Injury,,13NEB..L..Bu=. 373, 380 (1934).

